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ABSTRACT
Which kind of intellectual property regime is more favorable to innovation: one
that enforces patents or one that does not? Economic theory is unable to answer this
question, as valid arguments can be made both for and against patents; hence we
must turn toempirical evidence. In this paper, wereview empirical evidence gathered
byother researchersandaddnew evidenceofour own.Weconclude thattheevidence
suggests that patents do not promote innovation, but instead retard it.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Our concern is with a straightforward policy question: Which
kind of intellectual property regime is more favorable to innovation,
hence more conducive to technological progress, increasing factor
productivity, and Ð eventually Ð economic growth? More pre-
cisely, what is the role that patents play, or do not play, in fostering
technological innovation? A practical policy question such as this
rarely has a straightforward answer; this may be one of those rare
cases when it does. Our final answer, in fact, will be that there is
noevidencewhatsoever thatpatentsandcopyright fosterinnovation
and creation at large, while there is abundant evidence that they
damage it in particular instances, apart from inducing substantial
efficiency, rent-seeking, and distributional costs.
To allow for a focused discussion, we will pretend that a starker
difference between legal regimes exists, and it is the object of conten-
tion, than is probably feasible in reality where legislation must act
on a multidimensional continuum of choices. On the one hand, we
consider a regime in which patents are assigned easily, and then
strictly and forcefully enforced for a long time Ð as has been the
case in the United States for more than a century and increasingly
so since the middle 1980s. On the other hand, we consider a counter-
factual regime in which patents are hard to obtain, loosely enforced,
and last for brief periods of time only, i.e., a system in which imita-
tion, and the free-entry competition it brings about, rule. Subject to
the qualifications discussed in the paper, we call the latter arrange-
ment``competition''andtheformerone``monopoly.''Weask:Which
regime is more desirable from a social point of view?
At a theoretical level this question receives two straightforward
Ð but completely opposite Ð answers. Within a certain class of
models, ``monopoly'' is the necessary evil without which innovation
is impossible. Within a second class of models, ``competition'' nicely
provides innovation and, in some cases, even reaches first-best.
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Depending on the kind of assumptions one is willing to make about
the set of available technologies, the cost of imitation, and the speed
at which productive capacity can be built, economic theory may go
either way. In one case Ð when innovations are dramatic and well
identifiable, the cost of technological discontinuities is very high,
productive capacity is easily built, and imitation is costless Ð intel-
lectual property is likely to be a growth-enhancing arrangement.
This is recognized today as the ``received wisdom.'' In the opposite
case Ð wheninnovationsareadistributedandincrementalphenom-
enon the cost of which, while sometimes high in the aggregate, is
relatively low at each single step, productive capacity cannot be
rapidly adjusted, and imitation is costly Ð patent protection is likely
to be a growth-reducing arrangement. This latter view is considered,
nowadays, a form of ``economic heresy.'' It happens to be a view
of the innovation process that, among others, two of us have been
suggesting as appropriate for quite a while (see, e.g., Boldrin and
Levine 2008b).
The question of which regime actually induces more innovation
and is more socially desirable has been hardly considered at the
empirical level, where most researchers have been taking it for
granted that patents and copyright are the best incentives to innova-
tion, hence to economic growth. Because, at the end of the theoretical
day, the issue is an empirical one, it is to the small amount of
available empirical evidence Ð to which we add a bit of fresh
material Ð that we dedicate the bulk of this paper. Our examination
leans strongly toward the heretic option: all things considered,
patents do not have a favorable impact on technological innovation
and tend to hurt economic welfare. Nevertheless, we will not even
try to claim the issue can be settled on the basis of the available
evidence,ifanythingbecausethelatterisstillscarceandunsystemat-
ically organized. As mentioned, maybe because so little relevant
data have been collected or maybe because the received wisdom
hasbeensodominantforsolongthatempiricalverificationappeared
redundant, the number of empirical papers addressing the policy
question we have asked turns out to be very small. Better data and
more systematic analysis are therefore needed before any conclusive
policy prescription may be drawn.
We proceed through the following steps: In Section 2 we start
with a brief summary of the main theoretical features of the received
wisdom. That wisdom has two sharp and testable predictions:
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(a) The stronger the monopoly power granted by patents,
the higher the incentive to innovate, hence the faster
the growth rate of productivity.
(b) The innovation process consists of a sequence of dis-
cretejumps; ateach stepa newinnovator``jumps over''
the incumbent monopolist, acquires a patent to protect
her new innovation, and becomes a temporary monop-
olist, soon to be overtaken byan even better newcomer.
The empirical support for these predictions is considered in Sec-
tion 3, and we find it to be scant. In fact, we show that neither (a)
nor (b) receives any support in the statistical or historical literature.
More cogently, empirical research has focused on two lines of
investigation:
c the ``patent puzzle'' Ð i.e., the fact that, in recent decades, as
patent protection was progressively strengthened, we did not
observe an innovation explosion
c the ``inverted-U curve'' Ð i.e., the claim that, in the data, while
it is apparent that strong monopoly power does not favor
innovation, free competition may not be all that good, either,
and innovation is maximized somewhere in the middle.
While we have little to add to the interesting findings collected
in the patent-puzzle literature, we believe that something more can
be said about the inverted-U claim. Here we make two points, one
general and the other specific. The general point is that using the
number of patents (or their citations count) to measure the actual
number of innovations (or, better, their impact on productivity)
across sectors and firms may lead to somewhat biased results. While
many innovations lead to a patent, at least equally many other do
not; while many patents are associated with an actual innovation,
at least equally many others are obtained for legal or rent-seeking
purposes that have little or nothing to do with actual innovations.
As we show, while patent's citations may be vaguely correlated with
productivity growth, they are far from being a reliable measure of
it. This suggests treating with the greatest care those studies that
assume a close identity between the two: showing that, in the data,
X may increase patents is a long shot from showing that X also
increases innovations and labor productivity. The specific point Ð
developed in great detail in the Ph.D. dissertation of one of us,
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Correa (2010) Ð is that the inverted-U finding does not actually
withstand a careful statistical examination and disappears rather
quickly. When we re-examine the very same dataset in which the
inverted-U relation was claimed to exist, we find instead a robust
monotonerelationbetweenmeasuresofcompetitionandthenumber
of patent citations. As the heretic view predicts, this relationship
is increasing.
Section 4 summarizes the heretic line of thought according to
which imitation does not hamper, and in fact stimulates, innovation.
The heretic view predicts that we should observe a higher rate of
innovation in those sectors in which competition is stronger and
patent protection weaker. Because, as we argue, the heretic line of
thought rests on the assumption that most technological progress
is embodied in either human or physical capital, we also briefly
discuss the cumulated empirical evidence supporting this claim.
In Section 5 we test our theory using recent high-quality data. By
merging three different micro datasets on firms' patents, patent
citations, and productivity growth at the sectorial level, we show
there is a clear, monotone, increasing relationship between measures
of sectorial competition, the innovative activity of firms, and Ð most
importantly Ð labor productivity andtotal factorproductivity (TFP)
growth. The implications of our findings for future research and
actual policymaking are collected at the end, in Section 6.
2. RECEIVED WISDOM
The intellectual roots of the currently dominant consensus about
the role that patents and monopoly power play in the innovation
processwereplantedlongago:Schumpeter(1942)oughttobeseenas
its starting point, while Scherer (1990) is a leading current rendition
among industrial organization scholars.
A famous paper by Kenneth Arrow (1962) provided debatable
but authoritative information-theoretical support for the view that
``innovation is a public good.'' That view, in turn, gave rise to two
completelyoppositelinesofresearchandrelatedpolicyimplications.
According to one line of thought, if innovation is a public good,
then it cannot be provided by the markets, be they competitive or
monopolized; innovation needs, therefore, to be either produced
directly by government agencies or, at least, subsidized by means
of fiscal revenues and tax incentives. This was the line of thought
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Arrow's initial argument was meant to support and that still appears
as a logical consequence of the (in our view patently falsified) view
that innovation is a public good. According to the second line of
research stemming from Arrow's assumption, innovation becomes
an undersupplied public good because the property right system is
poorly designed: those contracts through which innovation can be
made excludable are not available in a competitive market system
as long as the latter allows for imitation. Patents can solve this
particular version of the ``tragedy of the commons'': they make
innovations excludable, thereby insuring at least a second-best out-
come Ð Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) contains a relatively recent, and
more elaborated, exposition of this point of view. This approach,
which had come to dominate theoretical and applied work in the
area of industrial organization by the late 1960s, was incorporated
into dynamic models of economic growth and capital accumulation
with the arrival of the so-called ``New Growth Theory'' (NGT) in
the late 1980s and early 1990s.
From a theoretical perspective, these two renditions of the view
that ``patents and legal monopoly are essential for innovation'' are
what we have in mind when we speak of the currently received
wisdom. Purely because of its very simplified analytical structure,
we will use here the Aghion and Howitt (1992) model as our ``repre-
sentative stand-in'' for this otherwise vast literature. Almost every-
thing we say applies equally well to all other NGT models produced
since the middle 1980s (in particular to those of Gene Grossman and
Elhanan Helpman, and of Paul Romer, which were both prior to
that of Aghion and Howitt) as well as to the classical contributions
in the field of industrial organization.
This literature posits a Htradeoff between ``static efficiency,''
achievable under free competition insofar as this leads to an efficient
allocation of resources for a given technology, and ``dynamic effi-
ciency,'' which is due to technological progress driven by patented
innovations aimed at acquiring a monopoly. While competition may
yield static efficiency, it fails to deliver the dynamic one; because
the latter is, arguably, more important than the former, free competi-
tion is not good for society. Patents are therefore a ``necessary evil'':
even if they sustain a technologically artificial monopoly power,
thereby reducing consumer surplus while they last, they are a neces-
sary tool for fostering dynamic efficiency over time. Innovative
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efforts would find no reward if the monopoly power that patents
create were absent Ð no patents, no party.
There are two key technological assumptions underlying the pre-
diction that, under competition and free-entry, dynamic inefficiency
(i.e., suboptimal innovative efforts) would be the outcome:
c The private fixed costs of innovation are ``large,'' at least rela-
tive to the size of the market and the evaluation (willingness to
pay) that the marginal consumer would give of the new good.
c Imitation is both simple and cheap, so much so that, within a
small span of time, so much productive capacity can be built
up that every competitor would be led to play a Bertrand game
when it comes to pricing.
It is obvious that, in a world where these two assumptions are
simultaneously realized, one would observe no innovation absent
patent's protection. Innovators would know that, as soon as they
had sunk their fixed cost and introduced the new good or the new
production method, imitators would flock into the market at zero
cost, building up excessive capacityand, because of Bertrand compe-
tition, driving prices to variable marginal costs. Because the latter
makes it impossible to cover the initial fixed cost, entrepreneurs
would not even bother trying to innovate, thereby leading the econ-
omy to technological stagnation. From this reasoning there follows,
on the one hand, the prediction that industries where imitation is
easy will not see much technological progress and, on the other, the
prediction that,in presence ofstrong patents, innovationwill instead
thrive. This is statement (a) in the introduction.
It is worth stressing that statement (b) is neither marginal nor
dispensable in this framework. When (b) fails, the model predicts
that (a) also would fail and innovation would come to a halt even
in a world where patents guarantee innovators a strong monopoly
power. To see this, assume the current incumbent monopolist can
Ð either through a sequence of very small innovations or by pur-
chasing the key factors its competitors need in carrying out their
research and development efforts Ð maintain its lead on the pack,
therebyprogressivelyreducingtheirchancestoeverbeableto``jump
over'' the incumbent with a breakthrough innovation. In other
words, assume the incumbent monopolist can make valuable inno-
vations extremely costly for its potential competitors; in this case,
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prediction (b) fails together with (a). In the Schumpeterian model,
when the monopolist is so far ahead of its competitors to feel safe
enough, the innovation machine stops operating and the economy
becomes stagnant (see Piazza 2010 for an insightful formalization
of this argument in a dynamic general equilibrium context). The
monopoly-based theory of creative destruction does require monop-
olists to be ``destroyed'' every so often: if the monopolist never
gets overtaken, then according to the theory there cannot be any
innovation.
3. CONCERNS ABOUT THE RECEIVED WISDOM: FACTS
Why should one doubt the sharp and reassuring predictions of
such an elegant theoretical apparatus? In the Schumpeterian-NGT
world we can have our cake and eat it too: patented entrepreneurs
are safely protected by the legal monopoly bestowed upon them,
making higher and safer profits, while innovative activity (hence,
technological progress and labor productivity growth) proceeds at
the highest possible pace. This distinct characteristic of the Schum-
peterian-NGT paradigm may well be the main reason behind its
wide academic and public success. By telling us that monopoly
power is socially benign because it generates ``dynamic efficiency,''
hence economic growth, at the very minor cost of some short-run
losses of consumer surplus, it reconciles the desire of protecting
what is already established with the urge to foster progress.
A world of low risk and high returns, though, seems too good to
be true. At a minimum it contradicts the basic economic intuition
according to which there are no free lunches and, in a world of
tradeoffs, rewards always entail some costs. More to the point, eco-
nomic theory has been arguing for centuries that competition is
conducive of good economic performances and good management
practices, and all the available evidence (Nickell 1996, Blundell et
al. 1999, Carlin et al. 2004, and Okada 2005 are some of the main
references within a very wide literature; for a decently recent survey
see Van Reenen 2010) suggests that, indeed, this is the case. If, in
general, more competition has been shown to foster better allocation
of resources, lower production costs, better management practices,
higher workers' and entrepreneurs' effort, adoption of technological
best practices, and so on, then it would be hard to believe on purely
theoreticalgroundsthattechnologicalchangeandinnovationshould
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make such an extraordinary exception to this general and repeatedly
confirmed rule.
This simple observation, after all, was at the root of an unfortu-
natelylittle-knownbutremarkablyprescientpaperbyGeorgeStigler
(1956), who Ð somewhat lonely Ð tried to argue that, to the best
of his knowledge, most of the great innovations of any century had
been created under conditions of competition and in the absence of
patents and legally enforced monopoly power. That same paper
contains a simple, somewhat artisanal empirical test in which Stigler
uses pre-World War II data to regress a raw estimate of sectorial
labor productivity growth against an index of sectorial concentra-
tion, finding that, indeed, the less concentrated an industry was, the
faster labor productivity grew, at least back then. As far as we can
tell, that was the first empirical refutation ever published of what
is now (and was becoming then) the established wisdom. Times
may have changed since (and they have indeed changed), hence the
need for replicating Stigler's test using more recent data and more
advanced statistical techniques, which we do in Section 5.
Before getting to it, let us consider a few other facts casting serious
doubts on the realism of the Schumpeterian-NGT theory.
3.1 Who Innovates?
A key prediction of the Schumpeterian view of innovation is that
the latter is the special product of large business organizations Ð
their unique contribution to economic growth and to the increased
social welfare it brings about. Matter of fact, Schumpeter's argument
rests more on the deep pockets and planning capabilities of large
conglomerates thanon patentsand intellectualproperty perse. After
convincing himself (do not ask us how) that socialist planning was
the best way to achieve economic growth, he was intent to convince
his readers that through the actions of the protected monopolies we
could have our cake and eat it too: socialist planning for workers
and consumers, and private property for the few lucky monopolists.
Unfortunately, the historical and statistical evidence points to the
exact opposite of what Schumpeter predicted. While large corpora-
tions are often (not always, maybe not even most of the times, but
certainly often) the outcome of major innovations Ð sometimes
patented and sometimes not; think of Ford and Edison, Sears and
Amazon, Microsoft and Google, AT&T and Wal-Mart Ð major inno-
vations are seldom if ever the product of large and monopolistic
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corporations. On the contrary, breakthrough innovations are more
often than not the product of small firms Ð competitive and creative
outsiders that must compete with established incumbents and are
able to do so because of their creative superiority. This fact, which
has been remembered and then forgotten innumerable times in the
applied economics literature, is documented once again in the recent
work of William Baumol, one of the most articulate supporters of
the central role played by the ``creative destruction'' mechanism in
generatingeconomicgrowth.So,forexample,inBaumol(2010,chap.
2) we find an excellent summary of a series of studies, produced
between 1995 and 2004 by the U.S. Small Business Administration,
documenting that, in spite of the fact that the bulk of R&D activity
is carried out by large corporations, the lion's share of technological
breakthroughs come from small firms. One may argue that these
findings may be biased by the fact that the SBA's task is to argue
exactly that. This is a correct observation that, nevertheless, cannot
erase the fact that the data reported in those studies have withstood
various years of attempted criticism and that the author quoting
them with approval is one of the strongest supporters of the Schum-
peterian view of technological progress. A second, critical observa-
tion may point out that a number of large corporations (IBM, Xerox,
Bell Labs, or Microsoft) have been innovating a lot. Leave aside the
fact that one would have a very hard time making the list longer
than the one above; the fact is that the first three Ð IBM, Xerox,
and Bell/AT&T Ð came up with lots of good ideas when they were
the dominant monopolists in their industries but left those ideas in
their drawers, not turning them into actual innovations until the
breakup of their monopoly power forced them to compete with
new entrants. Only then did their labs' good ideas turn into actual
innovations, which is exactly the opposite of what the Schumpeteri-
an's viewpoint implies. As for Microsoft, the answer is even simpler,
if historically symmetrical to the previous one. Microsoft was a great
innovative company until it had to fight to stay ahead of its competi-
tors, but it stopped innovating once it acquired its monopoly power.
Matter of fact, Microsoft would already be history if it were not for
the monopolistic grip it maintains on the market through its Win-
dows operating system.
Establishing that the bulk of innovations does not come from large
corporations but from small ones may or may not matter for those
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subscribing to a more ``elastic'' view of the creative destruction
mechanism, But it should at least serve as a reminder that, if patents
aresociallyhelpful,itisnotbecausetheyallowthebigconglomerates
to innovate (as in Schumpeter's initial theory), but Ð maybe Ð
because they allow the newcomers to enter a market. Hence, as
far as evidence is concerned, we are restricted to considering the
hypothesis that patents are good mostly for small firms and are
instrumental to the inception of new industries. Is this the case?
This leads to a more sharply defined empirical question. Consider
the 10 or 20 most economically relevant ``new industries'' of the last
century or two: from electrical machines and appliances to chemical
andthenpharmaceuticalproducts,fromthecartotheaviationindus-
tries, from software to hardware to mobile devices, from retail distri-
bution to steel, from the movie and television industry to banking
and finance. Most of these sectors are now relatively mature and
dominated by a few large companies, either country-by-country or
even worldwide, though to different extents. Nevertheless, when
we look back at their inception, be it more than a century or half-
century ago, not only do we not see any big conglomerate ``invent-
ing'' (say) the personal computer or the motor-car and protecting it
withapatent,but Ð practicallyalways Ð weseegroupsofsmalland
unprotected entrepreneurs introducing the new goods or services
without much patent protection, at least in the very initial stages of
the industry. The fact is that Ð even in the few cases when the
innovation that revolutionized an industry comes from within pre-
existing and relatively large companies in the same industry (think
of the role that Wal-Mart has played, for example, in dramatically
increasing the productivity of the retail and distribution sector, or
that the now-all-defunct investment banks played in the 1970s and
1980s in creating the modern financial industry) Ð patents play
either a minor role or no role at all in the gestation of the initial
innovation!
In the light of these and plenty similar observations, we wonder
why in the applied industrial organization literature the following
question seems to have never attracted the attention of researchers:
what does actually happen over the life cycle of a new industry?
The question is, at the same time, historical and statistical Ð purely
descriptive in some sense, but of great theoretical relevance. How
didthenewindustriesthathaveactuallyemergedsincetheinception
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of the industrial revolution about two centuries ago come about?
How many were fostered by a pre-existing large conglomerate and/
or protected by an array of patents? Along the life cycle of a new
good/technology, when does intellectual property enter the scene
andstartsplayinga(positive)roleinfosteringinnovation?Isintellec-
tual property there from the very beginning? Is it really the essential
obstetrician, without whom the healthy infant would never see the
light of day, let alone grow to become the powerful athlete it eventu-
ally will? Or is it something that comes much later in the life of
innovative industries, when the rate of innovation slows down, the
technology tends to mature, and the classic ``shake out'' stage is
under way or has just passed? Our guess, maybe anecdotal but not
completely uneducated, is that the ``stylized fact'' emerging from
such a careful historical investigation would be exactly the one we
are suggesting here through our rhetorical questions: as far as we
can tell, the main role intellectual property has played in the initial
development of the great industries of the last two centuries has
been either none or to delay some of them Ð see, e.g., Boldrin and
Levine (2008a, chaps. 1 and 8) for the cases of the steam engine and
the airplane, respectively. In the few cases in which patents helped
some among the initial innovators, such help was either damaging
to the growth of the industry overall (as in the case of radio through
the controversial Marconi patents) or it played an ambiguous role
by first enabling either ``theft'' or something pretty close to it, and
then leading to the creation of long-lasting and scarcely innovative
monopolies (as in the cases of Alexander Graham Bell and the tele-
phone, and of RCA and the television). The only important excep-
tions to these stylized facts we can think of are associated with the
name of Thomas Edison Ð the light bulb and related electrical
equipment.
Most certainly we may be wrong, which is why we hope someone
better equipped than we are will find the time and energy to look
carefully into this issue. For the time being, though, all the modern
industrial history available in print and online says that the Schum-
peterian-NGT prediction is much more a fable than history.
3.2 Revolving-door Monopolists?
Next is the observation that, while in the established model of
creative destruction progress comes from a new (patent-protected)
A : 31422$CH04
08-26-11 15:15:30 Page 13 Layout : 31422 : Odd
13
AGS (Comp) – 1A Pages
Mark all alterations on
these page proofsCATO PAPERS ON PUBLIC POLICY
monopolist overcoming the incumbent one with a superior innova-
tion rendering the latter's old patent irrelevant, this seldom happens
in practice. While we have been unable to find in the literature a
systematic statistical evaluation of this prediction and, due to lack
of means, we are unable to carry it out ourselves, we are willing to
argue, on the basis of a careful examination of a large number of
industries, that thisis another nice fable that almostnever has turned
into actual history.
This observation readily applies to mature industries, where we
observe two kinds of long-run market structures emerging. Most
common is the case in which the efficient technology is so widely
accessible that the sector has remained competitive and still experi-
ences a large amount of entry and exit even many decades after
having reached its maturity Ð e.g., textile and apparel, furniture
and house appliances, food and drinks, retail distribution, restora-
tion and hospitality, and so on and so forth for a long array of
``traditional'' goods and services. These mature industries still expe-
rience a fairly large amount of creative destruction, with local or
temporary leaders emerging and disappearing at a relatively high
frequency and, more importantly, a sustained growth of labor pro-
ductivity. Still, all this is achieved with little or no use of patents as
a tool for enforcing monopoly power, thereby contradicting at least
one of the two basic predictions of the Schumpeterian-NGT model
(innovationskeeptakingplaceintheseindustrieswithoutthehelpof
patents). Thesame modelis alsocontradicted forthe complementary
reason by those mature industries that evolved toward a long-run
oligopolistic market structure and in which patents are frequently
used to enforce monopoly rights over innovations. In these cases
Ðe.g., cars and trucks, trains and airplanes, personal computers,
proprietary software applications, shipbuilding, medicines, durable
goods in general Ð market leaders tend to remain the very same
few for very long periods of time (decades and decades, in fact)
with very little, often literally zero, entry of creative outsiders. In
all these industries, patents are certainly used and a more-or-less
high level of innovative activity does take place, but the creative
destructionmechanismpredictedbytheSchumpeterian-NGTmodel
never materializes. There may be ``creation,'' but there is very little
destruction: after a couple of decades, Microsoft Word Ð no matter
how cumbersome and little different from 20 years ago it happens
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to be Ð still is the market leader in word processing, not to speak
of Excel. The last time the market for word processing (or for spread-
sheets) experienced any kind of ``creative destruction,'' patents were
verboten in the software industry. This is not an exceptional case, as
a quick examination of the industries listed above (or of your own
consumption basket, for that matter) will easily confirm; there is a
lot of healthy creative destruction in free-market economies, but
little of it comes from the new creative patentee overtaking the old,
and no longer creative, patentee.
3.3 More Patents $ Higher Productivity?
Let us move on to a more delicate issue: Is there a sharp and
well defined one-to-one relationship between patents and actual
technological innovations? No matter how you turn it around, the
Schumpeterian-NGTtheorypredictsthat,thestrongerthemonopoly
power patents and the higher the (impact-weighted) number of
patents issued, the stronger productivity growth should be Ð with-
out ``if'' and without ``but.'' Coherently with such prediction,
patents, their numbers, and the number of times they are cited by
subsequent patents are by far the most commonly used measures of
innovation in most empirical industrial organization studies. Apart
from the predictions of the received wisdom, this common academic
habit has another reasonable justification: plenty of high-quality
econometric work (starting with Pakes 1986) has shown that citation
indices are a good measure of patents' quality and market impact.
They are, for example, important predictors of the stock market
valuation of the firm owning the patents. Frequently cited patents
are economically very valuable, while scarcely cited patents tend to
be associated with valueless innovations. In going from this finding
to the conclusion that patent citations are an overall good measure
of innovative activity, though, there is a far-from-obvious logical
step, which we consider next.
The problem is twofold: It seems reasonable to believe that if a
given innovation is both valuable and patentable, the innovator will
have an incentive to seek a patent. While a number of surveys (Levin
et al. 1987, Cohen et al. 2000) show that innovative firms very often
rely on tools other than patents (e.g., secrecy, lead time, and so on)
to achieve and maintain their competitive advantage, there is no
doubt that, when possible, firms do patent their valuable innova-
tions. It follows, therefore, that some innovations are contained in
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patents and that some patents contain actual innovations. The prob-
lem arises once we try replacing the two occurrences of the word
``some'' in the last statement with the words ``almost all.'' Safely
performing such substitutions is necessary for treating ``patents and
patent citations'' as adequate empirical measures of ``technologi-
cal change.''
In very many industries, patenting was not even an option until
a short while ago (e.g., the 1970s for plants, the 1990s for software,
the 2000s for business practices, etc.) and it is still not a truly usable
option for many other ones (e.g., retail and distribution, financial
products, fashion and design, telecommunications, and so on). What
this means is that lots of valuable innovations are not captured either
by patents or by patent citations, making the latter an incomplete
measure of the former. As the data below show, a very large number
of productivity-enhancing innovations are most certainly not cap-
tured by patents. The other side of the problem is subtler: how many
patents are issued (consequently, how often a patent is cited by
subsequent ones) is determined by the specific legal and industrial
organization characteristics of each different industry. Tens of thou-
sands of patents are awarded each year in the software industry,
while those in the car industry are counted in the hundreds. Some
ofthesepatentshaveinnovativecontents,butmanyothersarepurely
``defensive'' patents taken out for purely legal purposes and with
little or no innovation inside them. The cumulative research work
of James Bessen and his coauthors (e.g., Bessen 2003) has made this
fact plain in the case of the software industry.
As patenting became legally possible and spread widely across
the industry, the actual amount of innovation carried out certainly
did not increase and probably diminished, thereby making patents
(and citations) a very poor measure of what we often take them to
be. Our own somewhat artisanal examination of the agricultural
sector (e.g., Boldrin and Levine 2008a, chap. 3) has led us to the
same conclusion. After they were legally allowed in the early 1970s,
the number of agricultural patents exploded Ð especially in recent
decades thanks to the introduction of bio-engineered products Ð
but there is no evidence of a structural break whatsoever in the time
series of agricultural TFP either in the United States or in Europe.
Hence, whatever it is that the dramatic increase in agricultural
patents may be measuring, it cannot be the movement in agricultural
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productivity. Because it is the latter we care about, one should con-
clude that neither almost all innovations are contained in patents
nor almost all patents have innovative content.
Case studies aside, how serious is this problem, statistically speak-
ing, across a wide array of sectors and firms? In other words, for
the overall economy, how poor a measure of productivity growth
are patents and their citations? We try shedding some light on this
question by computing conditional and unconditional correlations
between patents and productivity measures from the same datasets
we use later in Section 5 to carry out our main tests. In this instance,
we have computed measures of labor productivity and TFP sector
by sector, together with patent numbers and citations for the firms
in each sector. Next, we have regressed both their levels and growth
rates on each other in a variety of reasonable combinations, both
unconditionallyandconditioningforinvestmentactivityinprevious
years and a number of common-sense control variables.
While not perfectly homogenous, our findings are nearly so. Their
basic message is that, except for a couple of specifications reported
below, there is not even a significant positive correlation between
patents and productivity. This is a more surprising result than one
would predict on the basis of purely theoretical considerations. In
fact, one would expect patents to be at least a decent predictor of
productivity growth across sectors; certainly for the last couple of
decades during which their use was extended to more and more
sectors. Instead we find a weak correlation in only two of the many
possible specifications, and no correlation at all otherwise! The data
suggest, in other words, that the use of patents either as a defensive
or as a rent seeking tool (Boldrin and Levine 2004, 2008b) is actually
more widespread than we had estimated it to be.
This specification yields a statistically significant, but very small,
positive coefficient when we apply it to U.S. Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics (BLS) output data, and a coefficient not statistically different
from zero when National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
output data are used. A quick look at Figure 1 suggests that a few
data points may be driving the result, hence Figure 2 reports the
same data without the top 5 percent observations for citations. In
Figure 2, the correlation is gone.
The role that the three statistical outlier sectors play in satisfying
the received wisdom's predictions is revealed by computing the 20-
year mean, at the North American Industry Classification System
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FIGURE 1
Patent Citations vs. Labor Productivity Growth
1987±2007
FIGURE 1
Patent Citations vs. Labor Productivity Growth
1987–2007
4-digit level, for both variables in each sector. This is depicted in
Figure 3. Also for sectorial averages, once the top 5 percent values
of the ``citations'' variable are dropped, the statistical correlation
weakens substantially and, also in this subsample, appears to be
determined by a small number of high-citation sectors. This is
depicted in Figure 4.
Very similar (in fact, weaker) results obtain when measures of
TFP are used. In the Appendix we report a number of additional
cloud-like plots that are representative of the kind of results one
obtains with different specifications. As the various graphs vividly
illustrate, even in the very long run, patents and their citations
measure only vaguely those innovations that actually increase either
labor productivity or TFP, and do so only for a handful of sectors.
Most observations are concentrated near the origin of the horizontal
axis, corresponding to very few or no patents and patent citations
at all; they display as much variance in the measured growth rates
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FIGURE 2
Patent Citations vs. Labor Productivity Growth
Top 5% Dropped
FIGURE 2
Patent Citations vs. Labor Productivity Growth
Top 5% Dropped
of productivity as the overall sample does, signaling that the larger
fraction of productivity-enhancing innovations are not captured
by patents.
This suggests that patents should not be used to assess which
firm innovates more and which firm innovates less, unless one is
capable of controlling for industry-specific effects and the various
strategic and legal considerations different firms face at different
points in time. From the point of view of economic theory and social
welfare, what matters is the growth of factors' productivity and not
of the number of patents per se. Contrary to what it has been doing
for decades under the influence of received wisdom, empirical
research in this area should focus on the former as the proper mea-
sure of socially desirable outcomes, treating the latter as a tool Ð
sometimes just a legal tool Ð that may or may not foster desirable
innovations and productivity growth. Whether patents do or do not
improve productivity should be the question we ask the data, not
the preset answer from which we start our investigation.
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FIGURE 3
Average Patent Citations and Average Labor Productivity
Growth
FIGURE 3
Average Patent Citations and Average Labor Productivity Growth
3.4 Inverted-U Relation?
In recent years, an empirical ``middle of the road'' position has
emerged within the Schumpeterian-NGT framework of analysis.
This position is widely seen as a way of reconciling the theoretical
predictions of that line of thought with the growing evidence that
increasing monopoly power does not generate more, but less, inno-
vation. Among others, the paper by Aghion et al. (2005) contains
the main empirical findings giving support for this position, while
the book by Aghion and Griffith (2005) provides a broader overview
of the whole line of analysis.
Aghion et al. (2005) develop a ``variety'' model in which competi-
tion is measured by the elasticity of substitution within pairs of
goods, each pair produced by a duopolistic industry. In this setting,
the higher the elasticity of substitution between the two goods is,
thehigher thereturnfrom innovationfor eitherofthe twoduopolists
will be. Assuming that sometimes one of the duopolists finds itself
to be a technological leader relative to the other, a high elasticity of
substitution between the two goods reduces the incentives to inno-
vate for the laggard when its distance from the leader becomes
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FIGURE 4
Average Patent Citations and Average Labor Productivity
Growth
Top 5% Dropped
FIGURE 4
Average Patent Citations and Average Labor Productivity Growth
Top 5% Dropped
particularly large. The authors interpret this kind of model as pre-
dicting that the maximum innovative effort will obtain at some
``intermediate'' position between perfect substitutability (competi-
tion) and perfect complementarity (monopoly). They compare these
predictions with the patenting activity in the United States for a
panel of United Kingdom manufacturing firms, claiming that their
model's predictions are supported by the data. This is interpreted
as a vindication of the basic intuition behind the Schumpeterian-
NGT theories, according to which at least some degree of patent
protection and monopoly power is good for technological progress.
In medio stat virtus.
The robustness andeven the very same existenceof such empirical
findings are questioned in the works of Correa (2010), first, and then
of Hashmi (2011). The latter re-examines the inverted-U relationship
between competition and innovation by using a different dataset
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covering publicly traded manufacturing firms in the United States
between 1976and 2001. Apartfrom a minor statisticaldetail, Hashmi
mimics the estimation strategy of Aghion et al. (2005). He replicates
their results for the UK dataset but, when using the U.S. dataset, he
finds a robust positive relationship between competition (as mea-
sured by the inverse of markups) and innovation (as measured by
citation-weighted patents). Hashmi conjectures that the different
findings may be due to the underlying characteristics of the two
different economies. In particular, he claims that a possible explana-
tion of the sharply different results may come from the fact that (in
his view) theU.S. manufacturing industries aretechnologically more
neck-and-neck than their counterparts in the UK. In other words,
there is a lot more competition among firms in the United States
than in the UK. In this case, because no competitor is ever ``far
behind'' the leader, the incentives to innovate that competition
induces are stronger; because there are not many laggards giving
up the race, there are also very few leaders that are able to keep the
lead without further innovations. The argument is more than a bit
lopsided because ``competition,'' in these regressions, means a low
markup and the argument we just summarized does not explain
why, in the United States, firms with very low markups should
innovate a lot while in the UK the same kind of firms innovate very
little. Further, as Hashmi (2011) remarks, this conjecture is not really
supported by the data and there is no independent evidence in the
literature that this should be the case. Finally, we note that, even if
the conjecture were supported by the data, it would simply mean
that, indeed, the more competition there is, the better competition
works. This tautology, at the very end, does not account for the
different empirical results between the U.S. and UK firms, which
remains a puzzle.
The investigation carried out by Correa (2010) shows, instead, that
there is no puzzle and that this particular conjecture is not necessary
to account for the different correlations observed in the two datasets.
This is because, most likely, the inverted-U pattern that Aghion et
al. (2005) claim to have discovered in the UK data is either not robust
to very reasonable perturbations or it is not there at all. Guided by
the well documented recent history of the U.S. patent system, Correa
begins his investigation by carrying out a simple Chow test on the
Aghion et al. (2005) data to find evidence that a structural break
A : 31422$CH04
08-26-11 15:15:30 Page 22 Layout : 31422 : Even
22
AGS (Comp) – 1A Pages
Mark all alterations on
these page proofsCompetition and Innovation
FIGURE 5
Competition and Patent Citations Prior to the CAFC
1973±1982
FIGURE 5
Competition and Patent Citations Prior to the CAFC
1973–1982 
took place in the early 1980s. This structural break coincides with
the establishment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC) in 1982. Scholars of intellectual property
have amply documented that the establishment of the CAFC had a
dramatic impact on the enforceability of patents and greatly
strengthened the position of patent holders, see e.g., Jaffe and Lerner
(2004), Kortumand Lerner(1998). Ittherefore increasedthe incentive
to apply for patents, and those applications started to increase at
about that time. By taking into account this break, Correa finds a
positive relationship between innovation and competition during
theperiod 1973±1982andnostatistically significantinnovation-com-
petition relationship during the period 1983±1994.
Figure 5 displays the sample observations of innovation and com-
petition levels before the establishment of the CAFC (period
1973±1982). We can see that some particular industries, such as
A : 31422$CH04
08-26-11 15:15:30 Page 23 Layout : 31422 : Odd
23
AGS (Comp) – 1A Pages
Mark all alterations on
these page proofsCATO PAPERS ON PUBLIC POLICY
FIGURE 6
Competition and Patent Citation After the Creation of the
CAFC
1983±1994
FIGURE 6
Competition and Patent Citation After the Creation of the CAFC
1983–1994
Motor Vehicles (Standard Industrial Classification 2-digit code 35)
and Chemicals (SIC2 25), have higher levels of innovation than the
rest of the manufacturing sector. However, as Figure 6 shows, after
the establishment of the CAFC, both the Motor Vehicles and the
Chemicals industries decreased their innovation intensity, while
industries such as Other Manufacturing (SIC2 49), Sugar Beverage
and Tobacco (SIC2 42), and Office and Computing Machinery (SIC2
33) increased their number of citation-weighted patents.
The Chow test looks for only one structural break without using
additional information about its location in time. Clearly, the break
could have taken place in another year or there could be more than
one break, hence a sup-Wald test is performed, which makes no
assumptions about either the number or the location of the structural
breaks. This test finds just one structural break and places it in 1981,
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while the CAFC was established only in 1982. However, it is worth
noting that in the dataset a patent is assigned to the year in which
the application was filed rather than the one in which it was granted.
While it is now greatly increased, reaching almost three years, a
substantial lag between applications and grants existed already in
the early 1980s. Furthermore, the establishment of the CAFC did
not come as a surprise to anyone, but was the consequence of a long
and public debate about the opportunity of introducing such a court
to strengthen the U.S. patent system. It seems therefore reasonable
to expect patent applications to react somewhat earlier on, in antici-
pation of the October 1982 establishment.
We leave it to the reader to decide which way the final jury should
lean. We are satisfied with having shown that, indeed, once one
takes into account a little tiny bit of well know history, the inverted-
U relationship is gone and a clear upward-sloping relation connects
the degree of competition with the strength of innovation also in
the particular dataset used by Aghion et al. (2005). That is, we like
to recall, the one and only dataset discovered so far in which a
modified version of the Schumpeterian-NGT theory appears to be
vindicated.
4. A DIFFERENT POINT OF VIEW
Since, in the data, one can hardly find any support either for the
claim that stronger intellectual property regimes favor technological
changeorforthegeneraltheoryaccordingtowhichmonopolypower
fosters innovation (there is, in fact, good evidence for the opposite),
while there is scant evidence even for the claim that patents are a
reliable measure of productivity growth, it is important to under-
stand how markets for innovation and technology adoption might
function in the absence of intellectual property. Innovative activity
has taken place historically and does take place currently, as plenty
of evidence shows, in markets where intellectual property restric-
tionsareeitherabsentorevennotallowed.Hence,inordertoexplain
the existence of something that standard theory predicts should not
even exist (i.e., competitive innovation), one needs to develop an
alternative theoretical framework, which we briefly outline next.
In the paper we quoted earlier, Stigler (1956, p. 274) argues that
monopoly is completely unnecessary to provide incentives for
innovation.
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There can be rewards Ð and great ones Ð to the successful
competitive innovator. For example, [consider] the mail-
order business.... The innovators ... were Aaron Montgomery
Ward, who opened the first general merchandise establish-
ment in 1872, and Richard Sears.... Sears soon lifted his com-
pany to a dominant position by his magnificent merchandis-
ingtalents,andheobtainedamodestfortune,andhispartner
Rosenwald an immodest one. At no time were there any
conventional monopolistic practices, and at all times there
were rivals within the industry and other industries making
near-perfect substitutes.
In more recent times, Liebowitz (1985), Hellwig and Irmen (2001),
Quah (2002), Legros (2005) and Boldrin and Levine (1997, 2005,
2006, 2008a,b) have all examined the competitive rents that accrue to
innovatorsdueto``limitedcapacity'' Ð thefactthat,inacompetitive
market, the owners of a fixed factor (first copy of an idea) are the
recipients of all downstream rents originating from it, and that an
infinite number of copies cannot be made instantaneously. The con-
clusion is that innovation will take place even without intellectual
property, as it often has in the past, see, e.g., the cases mentioned
by Moser (2002). While some of this work shows that there may be
too little innovation under competition due to the indivisible nature
of the initial copy of ideas, it also suggests that the appropriate
remedy is unlikely to be a government-granted monopoly.
On the one hand, it seems transparent that providing a reward
for innovation in the form of a monopoly can only increase innova-
tion, at least on impact. Indeed, this idea is so obvious it seems to
have an intellectual grip on the economics profession that a half-
century of empirical evidence to the contrary has been unable to
break. There is, however, a flip side to a patent system as opposed
toanindividualpatent:apatentsystemnotonlyrewardsinnovators,
it also makes it more costly to innovate in the face of the many
licenses that need to be acquired in order to bring a new product
to market. Hence, from a purely theoretical point of view, the impact
of patenting on innovation is ambiguous: it both encourages and
discourages innovation. Once this fact is taken into due account, it
is perhaps not such a surprise that no evidence has emerged that
there is a net positive effect. Scotchmer (1991) is among the first to
pointouttheproblemthatoccurswheninnovationsbuildonexisting
ideas. Formal models, first in the form of a simple example and later
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in the form of a detailed model of innovation, were provided in
Boldrin and Levine (2005).
On the positive side, Boldrin and Levine (2006) examine innova-
tion that is driven by the ``need'' for new technologies when old
technologieshaveexhaustedtheirgrowthpotential.Insuchasetting,
perfect competition delivers the first-best, as competitive rents are
exactly what is needed to provide the socially optimal level of inven-
tion. Hence, any intervention in the form of a government-granted
monopolystrictlyreduceswelfarebecauseamonopolistwouldaccu-
mulate each technology more slowly than under competition,
thereby increasing the time it takes to move from one technology
to the next, more productive one, thereby reducing the long-run
growth rate of consumption.
A further aspect of the theoretical problem, as Stigler briefly noted
in his 1956 article, is that the formal definition of competition is
capable only of capturing the final, stylized outcome and fails to
describetheprocess.Ina(perfectly)competitiveindustry,thepartici-
pating firms are small relative to the size of the market, produce
the same identical goods with the same identical technology, and
act as price-takers because there is nothing they can do that can
alter anything of relevance in the market in which they participate.
Such a description of ``competitive outcomes'' may be useful for the
study of general equilibrium arrangements in certain settings, but
it hardly seems capable of describing the underlying intuition
according to which ``competing entrepreneurs'' try to outsmart each
other by both imitating the best practices and improving upon them,
reducing production costs as much as possible (thereby de facto
implementing technological change) to finally bring about some
form of cost/price equalization among the surviving firms. It is the
latter, though, and not the former that one has in mind when saying,
intuitively, that ``competition fosters innovation.''
Is ``monopolistic or imperfect'' competition, then, the proper ana-
lytical answer to this unpleasant state of affairs? While one could
be tempted to say ``yes,'' at least instinctively, and then follow along
the lines ofAghion et al. (2005)and identify the extentof competition
with the degree to which one good is a substitute for another, there
are good reasons not to go that way. The extent to which a new
good is, or is not, a substitute for an already existing one is an
endogenous equilibrium choice, not an institutional or technological
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parameter, as innovators elect which niche to enter on the basis of
market incentives. This is, in fact, one of the channels through which
competition fosters innovation: the free entry of imitators/innova-
tors choosing either to expand total productive capacity or to build
up on previous innovations by introducing close substitutes of the
existing goods. Until we are able to build workable models of free
entry in which this dynamic aspect of competition is captured over
time, we must face the unpleasant choice of either going to the
extreme of ``perfect competition'' in which everyone always does
the same thing, or to that of ``monopolistic competition'' in which
every firm is actually a monopolist acting in parallel to other, similar
monopolists.
In any case, the key conceptual problem with the ``monopolistic
competition'' approach to modeling competition is that it is
grounded in the idea that imitation is costless, hence competitive
rents are irrelevant and competition would always bring about Ber-
trand pricing. When imitation is costly but competitive rents are not
immediately equal to zero Ð therefore, imitation is profitable Ð
monopolistic competition evaporates and the dynamic process of
competition with free entry sets in. In practice, imitation is costly
and, as noted above, a patent system serves only to discourage
downstream imitation. The latter point is important because in prac-
tice Ð as shown by the managerial surveys cited earlier Ð innova-
tions tend to be protected more by the difficulty of imitation than
through government intervention in the form of patents. This means
that, de facto, the role of patents is to discourage competition, free
entry, and indeed innovation; old incumbent firms acquire large
patent portfolios covering tens of thousands of known ideas with
the aim of using them as barriers against any entrant that does not
have a similar portfolio.
Finally, let us consider the following often-heard criticism of the
theoretical argument according to which competition favors innova-
tion more than (legal) monopoly does:
The Boldrin & Levine model has a built-in first mover advan-
tage. Of course, then, if the first mover advantage is big
enough you do not need patents. I never understood why
we should pay attention to such a trivial point (theoretically,
the empirical question of whether first mover advantages
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would be enough is of course relevant). Is there something
that I have been missing all of these years?
It is true that the essence of the Boldrin and Levine model is
a first-mover advantage generating competitive rents. Boldin and
Levine repeatedly mention it in their original paper on perfectly
competitive innovation (Boldrin and Levine 1997, 2008b), which
was in fact meant to show how the traditional Edgeworth-Marshall
framework of a competitive industry with free entry and minimum
plant size could easily be adapted to model repeated innovation in
a growth-theoretical setting. But there are two aspects in Boldrin
and Levine's paper that are not trivial at all, at least not for the
modern innovation and growth literature. First, they make the argu-
ment that there is always a first-mover advantage and that one can
predict how large it is on the basis of observables. In other words,
they give some structure to what the above criticism calls an advan-
tage ``big enough'' and show under which conditions it may or may
not obtain in practice. For instance, given the elasticity of demand,
they show that the first-mover advantage (and the incentive to
undertake an innovation) depends on two things: the initial cost of
getting the first unit of output (the prototype), and the rate at which
the invention can be copied. Second (and related to the previous
point),eveninmarketswhereitisveryeasytoreproducetheinnova-
tion, the rent of the first mover can potentially increase if consump-
tions between periods are substitutes.
Actually, we think there is a deeper point that the expression
``first-mover advantage'' misses. Also in a regime of monopolistic
competition, there is a first-mover advantage Ð a short-run monop-
oly. But whether the first-mover advantage is a legally induced
monopoly power (i.e., a market distortion) or competitive rent (fully
efficient) is quite relevant for both positive and normative analysis.
It is relevant for positive empirical analysis because one can use
statisticaldatatoquantifythetwouses of``enough''inthestatement,
``[W]hen the initial fixed cost is small enough relative to the size of
the market and the cost of copying is high enough, we will observe
sustained innovation under conditions of competition.'' It is relevant
for normative analysis because, to the extent it allows us to explain
the thousands of episodes of competitive innovation observed in
reality, it provides us with guidance for setting policies in this area.
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Second, the expression``first-mover advantage'' seems toimply that,
once there is a ``second mover,'' the first-mover advantage goes
away. It does not, and the framework mentioned earlier captures
this important fact well, while the one of monopolistic competition
misses it completely. This is because, in the Edgeworth-Marshall
framework, one assumes that capacity is bounded at every point in
timeandcostlytoaccumulate,whichisnotthecaseinthemonopolis-
tic competition case. Because of this assumption, in a competitive
industry rents are generated more or less for the entire life of the
industry; in the baseline case, without any external effects, all the
rents do go to the first mover but, in more general cases, they also
accrue to imitators and downstream innovators. We do not think
that is what has been historically meant by ``first-mover advantage''
and we would be pretty surprised if the above criticism meant that.
Asfaraswecantellfromthestrongresistancethissetofpropositions
still faces more than a decade after they were first published, these
statements are not widely accepted. The propositions may be wrong,
but they are definitely not ``trivial.''
There is another point in which the reported criticism is perfectly
correct. Ultimately it is an empirical question whether absence or
presence of patents distort markets more. The ``this is trivial'' criti-
cism seems unaware of a very long literature in and outside of
economics asserting that this is not the case and that, as a matter of
theory, absence of patents distorts markets more than their presence.
Aswehavedocumented,thereisanever-growing,longlistofempir-
ical economists surprised to learn that, in the data, patents lowered
rather than raised innovation and they have no idea why that might
be true. The theory of competitive innovation provides a testable
answer to this long-standing puzzle.
4.1 The Embodiment Issue
The ``embodiment hypothesis'' is a crucial step in the theoretical
argument claiming that competition, in the sense of free entry and
therighttoimitate,fostersinnovationandeconomicprogress.Before
moving forward to consider recent microeconomic evidence sup-
porting our claim, we should briefly explain why the embodiment/
disembodimentcontroversyisrelevantinthecontextofourresearch.
First off, what is the embodiment/disembodiment controversy?
It centers on the fact that technological advances may or may not
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be obtained without embodying them in something material and
expensive to either produce or acquire Ð that is, in some ``capital,''
be it physical or human or organizational. Traditional treatments of
the TFP measure describe the latter as completely disembodied and
unrelated to investment expenditure. Most likely, this did not corre-
spond to the intuition many researchers had of the nature and causes
of TFP Ð certainly, it was not what Robert Solow had in mind.
Nevertheless, it was the formalism adopted in writing Y 4 AF(K,
L), where Y is output, A is TFP, K is the stock of capital, and L is
the flow of labor entering the neoclassical production function F.
The same is true for the literature we have classified as Schumpeter-
ian-NGT: while some of those arguments would, formally, go
through even if the new technology were embodied in some kind
of capital good, most models use a disembodied representation of
technological progress to formalize their argument. There are purely
technical reasons for this choice (i.e., deriving a balanced growth
path), but there are also intuitive and conceptual ones, which should
be understood as they are relevant for the issue concerning us here.
The fundamentallink betweendisembodiment andthe Schumpet-
erian-NGT view of the world is related to the assumption of
unbounded productive capacity that the Schumpeterian-NGT view
needs to make in order to reach its specific conclusions. In fact, for
the ``imitation will destroy innovator's rents'' argument to work,
one must assume that imitators will force Bertrand pricing almost
immediately. For Bertrand pricing to make sense, one needs a situa-
tion in which each of the competitors is capable of satisfying total
demand all alone, which requires productive capacity to be instanta-
neously expandable. While one may pretend that the available quan-
tities of physical and human capital of a certain kind (i.e., the kind
embodying the new technology) can beincreased at an infinite speed
atnocost,thisseemsinclear violationofthebasiceconomicintuition
accordingtowhichthereisnofreelunch.Insuchcontext,thehypoth-
esis that the new idea or technology is actually disembodied and
that, therefore, one can make a very large number of copies of it at
no cost and in no time seems necessary to move the argument
forward. More generally, the view according to which ideas, once
discovered,canbeimmediatelycopiedbyanyoneatnocostrequires,
conceptually, a form of general disembodiment of the idea itself
that, like a light in the sky, appears to, and is immediately usable by,
everyone else, were it not for the legal restriction that patents imply.
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At the opposite extreme, when a new idea is fully embodied either
in an object owned by the creator or in her human capital, it is up
to her to decide what to do with it and unauthorized imitation
becomes, if not impossible, certainly neither easy nor legal. This is
the key fact allowing innovators to be rewarded for their inventions
even in the absence of the specific privileges that intellectual prop-
erty introduces. Matter of fact, the theory of competitive innovation
rests on the twin hypotheses that
c inventors have control of their inventions and will require
appropriate payment to make it available to others, and
c imitation is always and everywhere costly because it requires
either producing or acquiring the material object or the human
capital embodying the innovation.
These two assumptions, which we consider most natural, imply
that productive capacity embodying the new technology will build
up only slowly, the price of the new good will be determined by
demand for quite a while, and the long-run position in which price
equals average cost will be reached only in the long-run equilibrium
of the competitive industry. As a consequence, competitive rents
will be attained by both the innovator and her imitators. Also in
this case, one can certainly conceive of circumstances in which such
rents could obtain even when the innovation is completely disem-
bodied,but thosecases appearto beeither exceptionalor far-fetched.
In conclusion, the theory of competitive innovation rests on the
factthat innovationsareembodied while,symmetrically, theSchum-
peterian-NGT view of innovation rests on the fact that innovations
are disembodied. The latter is a factual issue and it should be
resolved empirically. Common-sense inspection of actual innova-
tions fails to deliver (as far as we can tell) convincing examples of
actual innovations that were completely disembodied and could be
instantaneously reproduced in an unlimited amount with zero costs
of imitation. Even the commonly used examples of ``digital goods''
(whose historical relevance if clearly limited, given that they were
not around until a couple of decades ago) fail the test. Unless the
original creator voluntarily releases the master copy of the digital
good in question, making a large number of copies of it available
to consumers is technically impossible, even assuming the machines
through which reproduction and distribution of digital goods take
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place are costless, which they are not. In a world of free competition,
creators will charge a price to release the master copy to imitators
and, in equilibrium with free entry, it is easy to show that such a
price will be equal to the net present value of all future rents (Boldrin
and Levine 2008b).
The applied statistical literature on this argument is very large
and our reading is that Ð since Zvi Griliches' path-breaking 1957
Ph.D. dissertation Hybrid Corn: An Exploration in the Economics of
Technological Change Ð it leans almost completely in favor of the
embodiment hypothesis. It should be pointed out here that Robert
Solow himself, with whom many people tend to associate the idea
of ``disembodied TFP,'' always squarely supported the view that
the quantitatively relevant type of technological progress is, in fact,
embodied in one form of capital or another.
In any case, this is not the appropriate place to engage in a full
survey of the embodiment controversy, even if it may be the place
to point out that an updated and careful summing-up of the half-
century-old debate would be most welcome in light of its fundamen-
tal relevance when it comes to modeling innovation. We will there-
fore limit ourselves to summarizing the findings of a recent micro-
investigation of this issue, which uses an original and very powerful
dataset and that is one of the few to address squarely the questions
that concern us, i.e., the empirical relevance of ``disembodied exter-
nal effects'' from technological innovation across competing firms.
Castiglionesi and Ornaghi (2011) make use of an unbalanced
micro-panel dataset of Spanish manufacturing firms observed with
annual frequency during the period 1990±2006. This dataset proves
to be particularly suitable for disentangling the impact of specific
individual sources of productivity growth, as it includes detailed
observationsonfirms' outputs,inputs,proportionof skilledemploy-
ees, types of capital investment undertaken, and modifications of
the production processes. Moreover, a unique feature of this dataset
is that it provides growth rates of firm-specific prices for outputs
and intermediary inputs, thus allowing for the construction of a
more reliable measure of firms' productivity change.
Their estimation builds up progressively from a simple regression
that reveals a large and unexplained residual representing the
(unweighted) average TFP growth across firms. Traditionally, this
is taken as a measure of ``disembodied technological progress''; their
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goal is to show that, using the micro-observations listed above, one
can show it is actually accounted for by very embodied investments
in some kind of capital. To this end, they start by analyzing the
contributionsoftraditionaldisembodiedvariablesassourcesofaver-
age TFP growth. They consider firm-specific learning-by-doing
(LBD) and unpriced externalities such as those acting through aggre-
gate human capital and the spillovers of R&D from firm to firm.
The quantitative role played by such variables in accounting for TFP
growth at the firm level is often argued to be strong evidence,
possibly the strongest, in favor of the Schumpeterian-NGT theory
of innovation and growth. Because, this theory says, technological
progress is mostly disembodied and generates large externalities at
no explicit cost to the recipients, patents are necessary to allow
inventorstomaketheirproductsexcludable,thereforeappropriating
atleastpartoftheirsocialreturns.Withoutpatents,privateappropri-
ation of the returns from innovative investments would become
impossible and the value of the innovation for the innovator would
dissipate through the external effects induced by free imitation.
Castiglionesi and Ornaghi replicate in their dataset the well known
earlier results showing that certain aggregate variables Ð interpre-
ted as the source of disembodied technological progress and
unpriced externalities Ð are correlated to average TFP growth at
the industry level.
Next,theytake intoaccounttherelevanceof (humanandphysical)
capital-embodiedtechnologicalprogressasanengineofTFPgrowth.
They measure the impact of new capital goods on TFP by means of
two variables: the average vintage of the physical capital and an
index of new technology usage. They account for differences in
human capital using two variables: firm wages and the percentage of
R&D employees at the firm level. To deal with classical endogeneity
issues, they estimate a specification with the ratio of skilled workers
at the firm level instead of firm wages. Once the measures of embod-
ied technological progress are considered, the variables that capture
firm-specific LBD, human capital externalities, and R&D spillovers
no longer show any relevance in affecting average TFP growth either
at the firm or industry level. In other words, once they account for
variations in physical and human capital that are measurable at the
firm level, the external effects completely evaporate and are no
longer relevant in ``explaining,'' even statistically, the movements in
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TFP. In fact, Castiglionesi and Ornaghi find that embodied variables
alone can fully explain average TFP growth across firms and indus-
tries. Last but not least, in all specifications, constant returns to scale
cannot be rejected.
Finally, in order to better assess firm-specific LBD and to look
more carefully into the presence of potentially external effects, they
consider two alternative measures that, arguably, are closer in spirit
to the theoretical idea behind LBD: cumulative output since the
introduction of a process-innovation, and time after the introduction
of a process-innovation. These two variables should capture the idea
that a change in the methods and techniques used for production
must trigger a new learning cycle of the workforce at the firm level.
When considered together with the embodied variables, these alter-
native measures of firm-specific LBD retain explanatory power. This
is coherent with the classical definition of LBD: internal to the firm,
short-lived, and due to the adoption of new processes. In other
words, there is no evidence of unpriced spillovers in this dataset.
These results, taken together with those relative to the embodiment
of TFP, cast a long shadow on the idea that spillover effects external
to the firm play a major role in technological progress and in the
increase of TFP along the lines assumed in the Schumpeterian-
NGT paradigm.
Summing up: Castiglionesi and Ornaghi's findings prove that
things such as ``free imitation'' and ``disembodied technological
progress'' Ð generated via a chain of external spillovers from one
firm to another Ð find scant support in actual microeconomic data.
Innovations and technological change appear to originate at the
firm's level and are mostly embodied in their investment decisions,
which are therefore both costly and internal. Average TFP growth
is fully explained by the kind of technical progress that is embodied
in actual physical and human capital; economy-wide neutral (or
disembodied) technical change plays virtually no role.
5. NEW FINDINGS
We have already seen in Section 3 that, contrary to what received
wisdom keeps repeating, the available empirical evidence about the
statistical relation between measures of competition and patents
point to a positive link: more competition, more (highly cited)
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patents. Still, because we have also seen that patents and their cita-
tions are poor predictors of productivity growth, these results imply
relativelylittlewithrespecttothepolicyissueatstake:Doescompeti-
tion foster productivity growth more or less than monopoly?
With the aim of replicating Stigler's test on more recent micro
data, we have constructed a dataset that includes, among other
measures, patent counts and patent citations for 220 4-digit SIC code
industries over the period 1990±2001 and productivity growth for
85 4-digit NAICS code industries over the period 1987±2008. The
raw data used to construct this dataset come from different sources.
Firm balance-sheet and financial data available in Compustat are
matched with firm-level data on patents retrieved from the NBER
Patent Data described by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001). Total
output data for SIC-4 manufacturing industries are taken from the
NBER and U.S. Census Bureau's Center for Economic Studies (CES)
Manufacturing Industry Database described by Bartelsman and
Gray (1996). Information on output, inputs, and productivity for
NAICS-4 manufacturing industries are obtained from the BLS.
Finally,weretrieveinformationonU.S.importsatSIC-4andNAICS-
4 industry level from the U.S. Department of Commerce and the
U.S. International Trade Commission. The accounting data retrieved
from Compustat include sales S (item 12), gross capital K (item 7),
operating profits OP (item 13) and advertising expenditure A (item
45) for the period 1990±2006. The data we use refer to all firms in
the manufacturing sector; this includes 7,432 firms divided in 220
industries according to the 4-digit SIC code.
This large dataset allows us to construct more accurate measures
of innovation and competition and to test the robustness of our
findings when different outcomes are used to capture technological
change and productivity growth. Specifically, innovation is mea-
sured with two different sets of variables. The first set consists of
numberofpatentsandnumberofcitationsreceivedbythosepatents.
As opposed to a simple patent count, citations can capture not only
the quantity of ideas produced but also the quality of those ideas.
The main advantages of patents compared to other R&D indicators
are that they provide a measure of successful research output and
they are objective in so far as they are not influenced by accounting
practices. At the same time, there are a number of limitations in
measuring innovation through patents, which we have already dis-
cussed and documented in Section 3 above. As we showed there,
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patents and citations measure only a relatively tiny fraction of the
actual output of innovative activity. Moreover, patents cannot
account for efficiency gains due to the adoption of the most efficient
technologies and best managerial practices as long as these are not
patented, nor can they account for the increased productivity that
follows the introduction of new goods and services not covered
by patents.
Coherently with the discussion carried out in Sections 3 and 4,
and in order to overcome these limitations and to provide a check
of robustness of our findings, the second variable we use to capture
technological advances refers to firms' productivity growth com-
puted either as TFP or as labor productivity for 85 different NAICS-
4 manufacturing industries over the period 1987±2008, as calculated
on the basis of either NBER or BLS output data. Competition is an
indexbasedontheprofitabilityoftheindustryandtakesvaluesfrom
0(lowcompetition/highprofits)to1(highcompetition/lowprofits).
On the basis of the data so organized, first we have replicated
and extended the empirical model discussed in Section 3 (see Correa
2010) with innovation (patents or patent citations) on the left-hand
side and competition (inverse ofprofitability) on the right-hand side.
In line with the theoretical arguments developed in Section 4 as well
aswiththeempiricalresultsdiscussedinSection3,wefindapositive
relationship that is remarkably robust to changes in industry classifi-
cation (SIC4 vs. NAICS4), time sample period (1990±2001 vs.
1975±2001), and set of sampled industries (manufacturing vs. all
industries).
Granted, then, that the traditional measures of innovations are Ð
in our dataset very much like those considered in Section 3Ð
positively correlated with the most natural index of competitive
pressure, we moved next to the issue that is most important for us,
i.e., the correlation between the latter and objective measures of
productivity growth. The next two figures (Figures 7 and 8) are
based on NAICS 4 industries for the period 1987±2007. Figure 7
seems to suggest that, when one regresses productivity growth on
the inverse of profitability, the inverted-U relationship that had been
pushed out the door in the case of patents strikes back with a ven-
geance when studying labor productivity growth.
Nevertheless, as amply discussed in Correa and Ornaghi (2011)
and Hashmi (2011), the (inverse of) profitability is clearly an endoge-
nous outcome that depends, among other things, on the ability of
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FIGURE 7
Labor Productivity Growth and Competition
FIGURE 7
Labor Productivity Growth and Competition
FIGURE 8
Labor Productivity Growth and Lagged Competition
FIGURE 8
Labor Productivity Growth and Lagged Competition
firms (in each sector) to reduce costs and increase prices through
innovations that increase labor productivity.
To deal with this problem, Figure 8 is obtained by regressing
labor productivity growth on lagged inverse profitability, i.e., on
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FIGURE 9
Labor Productivity Growth and Lagged Competition
Sectorial averages
FIGURE 9
Labor Productivity Growth and Lagged Competition
Sectorial averages
 
measured sectorial competition during the previous period. This
``simple'' change has a dramatic effect: from an inverted-U we move
to a clear positive relationship Ð and a very robust one as the tests
reported in Correa and Ornaghi (2011) show.
This result is confirmed when the observations are aggregated
sector by sector and the regression is performed using the sectorial
averages on both sides of the equality sign. If possible, the positive
relationship displayed in Figure 9 is more pronounced than that in
Figure 8.
It is worth stressing that, because of re-scaling, the interval of
variation of productivity growth, as reported in Figure 9, may incor-
rectly appear as exceedingly small. This is not the case; when
expressed in percentage points per year, the effect of increased com-
petition is actually quite strong. Once the few very monopolized
sectors in which our index of competition is lower than 0.7 are
dropped, the actual lower bound is a growth rate of 1.5 percent per
year (recall that these are sectorial averages) and the upper bound
is 3.5 percent. In other words, the average annual growth of produc-
tivity in the sectors with the highest level of competition is up to 2
percent bigger than in the sectors with the lowest level of competi-
tion. These are strikingly large differences when cumulated over
various decades, as is the case in our dataset.
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6. OPEN ISSUES AND CONCLUSIONS
Economic theory is ambiguous when it comes to assessing if either
competition and free entry or patent protection and the monopoly
power it induces define the best institutional environment to foster
innovation and technological progress. The empirical evidence,
though, is overwhelming: far from fostering and stimulating innova-
tion and productivity growth, patents are likely to hamper them
while free entry and competition appear to be at least correlated
with (if not to cause) labor productivity and TFP growth. This has
an obvious implication: there are no objective reasons whatsoever
to strengthen patents any further than we have already done. In
fact, it seems urgent to begin undoing some of the damage we have
been doing to ourselves over the last 30 years, and work to reform
Ð slowly but surely Ð the overall system of intellectual property.
Reforming the system is neither politically easy nor is it obvious,
at least to us, which steps are appropriate and in which order they
shouldbeundertaken.Matteroffact,thenumberofempiricalstudies
that have carried out well designed counterfactual exercises capable
of assessing how an alternative legal system would affect innovative
activity and which parts of the current one are the most damaging
to technological progress is exceedingly small. What this means is
thatthe veryfirstpolicy goalmayjust bethatof advocating,support-
ing,and carryingoutwell designedempiricalstudiesof howinnova-
tion and technological progress fare across sectors, countries, and
time periods, under different legal and incentive systems. Our basic
intuition, grounded on the research either presented or referred to
here, is that the current systems of intellectual property are tanta-
mount to the trade restrictions in existence until a few decades ago,
and their dismantlement should be approached in the very same
fashion, piece by piece and quite patiently.
We do not have, therefore, any grand strategy to propose, but
just a short list of general goals plus a few somewhat more specific
ones in those particular areas where, we believe, economic analysis
has managed to dig deeper. Because policy proposals are better
digested and metabolized when served in the form of small pills,
here is our list:
c Stop the still-rising tide that, since the early 1980s, is both
extending the set of ``things'' that can be patented and shifting
A : 31422$CH04
08-26-11 15:15:30 Page 40 Layout : 31422 : Even
40
AGS (Comp) – 1A Pages
Mark all alterations on
these page proofsCompetition and Innovation
the legal and judicial balance more and more in favor of
patent holders.
c Because competition fosters productivity growth, antitrust and
competition policies should be seen as key tools to foster inno-
vation. This is of particular relevance for high-tech sectors,
from software, to bioengineering, to medical products and
pharmaceuticals.
c Free trade is a key part of competition policies, hence the
role that the World Trade Organization, World Intellectual
Property Organization, and Trade Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights agreement play should be redefined to
move away from the current neo-mercantilist approach to free
trade in goods and ideas. The aim here should be that of
stopping the policy of exporting our intellectual policy laws
to other countries while adopting a policy of exporting free
tradeandcompetitionininnovation.Thisseemstousanurgent
goal because, within a couple of decades, the ``balance of trade
in ideas'' between the United States and Europe on one hand
and Asia on the other may easily reverse. At that point the
temptation to engage in ``mercantilism of ideas'' may well
affectthenow-developingAsiancountries,leadingtoageneral
increase in intellectual property protection worldwide.
c Cross-industry variation in the importance of patents suggests
we may want to start tailoring patent length and breadth to
different sectorial needs. Substantial empirical work needs to
be done to implement this properly, even if there already exists
a vast legal literature pointing in this direction.
c Reverse the burden of proof. Patents should be allowed only
when monopoly power is justified by evidence about fixed
costs and actual lack of appropriability. The operational model
should be that of ``regulated utilities'': patents should be
awarded only when strictly needed on economic grounds.
c Use prizes and competition to nurture innovation. An interest-
ing approach is to change the role that the National Science
Foundationand theNationalInstitutes ofHealthplay infoster-
ing innovation. The basic goal, in this case, is that of reversing
the principle according to which federally financed investiga-
tion can lead to private patents. As a first step we would
advocate going back to the old rule according to which the
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results of federally subsidized research cannot lead to the cre-
ation of new private monopolies but should be available to all
market participants. This goal is particularly important in the
pharmaceutical industry.
c With regard to the pharmaceutical industry, we advocate
reforming pharmaceutical regulation to either treat Stage II
and III clinical trials as public goods (to be financed by NIH
on a competitive basis) or by allowing the commercialization
(at regulated prices equal to the economic costs) of drugs that
satisfy the Food and Drug Administration requirements for
safety even if they do not yet satisfy the current, over-demand-
ing requisites for proving efficacy. It is ensuring the efficacy
Ð not the safety Ð of drugs that is most expensive, time-
consuming,anddifficult.Alltheusualmechanismsofensuring
the safety of drugs would remain firmly in place. While phar-
maceutical companies would be requested to sell new drugs
at ``economic cost'' until efficacy is proved, they could start
selling at market prices after that. In this way, companies
would face strong incentives to conduct or fund appropriate
efficacy studies where they deem the potential market for such
drugs to be large enough to bear the additional costs. At the
same time, this ``progressive'' approval system would give
cures for rare diseases the fighting chance they currently do
not have. This solution would substantially reduce the risks
and cost of developing new drugs.
c If this progressive approval approach works for rare diseases,
there is no reason it should not be adopted across the board.
Thecurrentsystemfavorsa smallnumberofblockbusterdrugs
that can be sold to millions of patients. The coming revolution
in medicine will rely on carefully targeting hundreds or even
thousands of drugs to the correct patients. But lawmakers
must first usher in a new system that makes developing these
precision treatments possible. The regulation reform we are
suggesting here would be a first important step to achieve
such goal.
c Finally, software patents are a particularly egregious and bad
form of intellectual property for a sector where we also have
very detailed micro evidence about the role of patents in (not)
promoting innovation (see, e.g., Bessen and Meurer 2008 and
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FIGURE A1
Patent Citations and Labor Productivity Growth
Right panel excludes the top 5 percent of performers
FIGURE A1
Patent Citations and Labor Productivity Growth
Right panel excludes the top 5 percent of performers
references therein). The same arguments are likely to apply to
bio-engineering and genetic research at large. The goal of pol-
icy, in these cases, should be just that of slowly but surely
decreasing the strength of intellectual property interventions.
APPENDIX
Figures A1 and A2 reproduce the above Figures 1±2 and 3±4,
respectively, with each industry's NAICS4 number appended to its
data point. This should allow the interested reader to make up his
mind about the extent to which, sector by sector, patent citations
counts are, or are not, a good proxy for those factors that, in practice,
do increase productivity. We remind readers that these are averages
over the 20-year period 1987±2007.
Figures A3 and A4 are from the same dataset. They have labor
and TFP growth on the vertical axes, respectively, and citations
growthonthehorizontalaxes.Thereisnocorrelationineitherfigure.
Figures A5±A8 should allow for a better understanding of the
findings reported in Section 5. A5 and A6 show how the inverted-
U relationship (left) and the positive relationship (right) fit the actual
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FIGURE A2
Average Citations and Average Labor Productivity Growth
Right panel excludes the top 5 percent of performers
FIGURE A2
Average Citations and Average Labor Productivity Growth
Right panel excludes the top 5 percent of performers
FIGURE A3
Citation Growth and TFP Growth
FIGURE A3
Citation Growth and TFP Growth
.
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FIGURE A4
Citation Growth and Labor Productivity Growth
FIGURE A4
Citation Growth and Labor Productivity Growth
FIGURE A5
FIGURE A5 
Relationship between Competition and Labor Productivity Growth
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FIGURE A6
FIGURE A6 
Relationship between Competition and Labor Productivity Growth 
FIGURE A7
FIGURE A7 
Labor Productivity Growth and Competition 
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FIGURE A8
FIGURE A8 
Labor Productivity Growth and Lagged Competition
observations. Both curves are, overall, quite flat. A7 and A8 replicate
those displayed in Section 5. They are a ``zoom'' of the fitted line
reported in the corresponding top graphs above. The two graphs at
the top reveal the ``fragility'' of the empirical analysis based on these
specifications and underline the need for additional research.
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As someone who got the ``received wisdom'' about the economics
of innovation as a part of his schooling, I approached the ``economic
heresy'' of Michele Boldrin and David Levine with some skepticism.
I was also intrigued. This paper, with coauthors Juan Correa and
CarmineOrnaghi,(hereafterBCLO) discussesthosetheoreticalargu-
ments, presents empirical evidence, and draws out the policy impli-
cations. While I don't think they make a convincing case for disman-
tling the patent system, I do find parts of the argument compelling.
Competing Theories of Technological Change
In the introduction to his 1990 article in the Journal of Political
Economy, Paul Romer articulates what I think of as the received
wisdom. It starts with a careful account of the production function.
Economic output is produced with factors of production, unskilled
labor, skilled labor, machinery, etc. Technology is the recipe book
for how to combine these ingredients (the factors of production) to
produce goods that we like. In principle, you could always make
twice as much of any good you're currently making by using twice
the quantity of each ingredient. You don't need a new recipe to do
that. Similarly, with the same recipe, anyone else could produce
more of what you are currently making. A recipe is said to be non-
rival as any number of people can use it simultaneously. That's why,
in a competitive equilibrium, all the revenue from production is paid
to the factors of production, with nothing left to pay for the recipes.
Numerous studies have shown that the growth of factors of pro-
duction leaves much to be explained in accounting for economic
growth. It seems that the recipes must be getting better, and casual
observation, for example using a new smart phone, supports that
view. Since technological change appears to be a crucial source of
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rising living standards, yet a competitive market doesn't provide
incentives forinventive activity, weare fortunate tohave institutions
that fill the gap. The patent system is one of them, allowing the
owner of a patented recipe to restrict its use by others. The patent
holder gets some monopoly power. The expectation of monopoly
profit is an incentive to invent new recipes.
What could be wrong with this received wisdom? The starting
point of the ``economic heresy'' is the observation that it can be
difficult to separate the recipe from the chef. New techniques are
often embodied in people or machines. It takes time and effort to
train people or build machines. While a component of the technique
may be non-rival in principle, it may not be easy to replicate in
practice. The good techniques end up being used by some and not
by others. A consequence is that there can be rents to the inventor
of a new technique, even in the absence of patent protection.
This starting point is quite compelling and is, in fact, a common
view of technology. A recent paper by Robert Lucas (2008), while
not modeling any payments, envisions the diffusion of techniques
inthis way.A techniqueonly spreadsfrom oneindividual toanother
via a chance meeting and an ensuing transfer of information (from
one brain to the other). Note that techniques are non-rival goods in
this economy. But, because they are embodied in individuals, the
good techniques aren't instantaneously replicated. In this economy,
one could imagine that an individual with knowledge of a good
technique might put a price on the service of teaching it to some-
one else.
These arguments become less abstract with a specific example in
mind. Consider a new technique for folding metal into various
shapes without weakening it. The idea behind it is non-rival. A good
engineer could look at it, get the idea, and decide how it could be
put to use in his manufacturing process. Without patent protection,
the inventor of this technique would seem to have no means of
extracting any return from it. But actually adopting the new process
of folding metal requires specialized machinery and training of engi-
neers. The inventor knows how to make it work but the potential
users do not. It is not hard to see how, even in the absence of a
patent, the inventor could profit from manufacturers who hire him
as a consultant to get the process up and running.
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The Challenge for Empirical Work
Faced with these two scenarios and their starkly different policy
implications for the patent system, how can we use data to resolve
the issue? In principle we'd like to build an economic model that
encompasses these two scenarios. The model would also incorporate
features of the current patent system, as well as other mechanisms
inventors use to appropriate returns, such as trade secrecy. We
would then confront this model with microeconomic data of various
sorts in order to estimate the relevant parameters. Finally, using
these estimates of the parameters, we would perform various count-
erfactual simulations of the model to examine the outcomes for
economic growth and economic welfare under various possible
reforms of the patent system. We could then make policy recommen-
dations with some confidence, based on such a systematic quantita-
tive analysis.
Back to reality: While a worthy goal, we have a long way to go
before we can carry out such a research agenda in a satisfactory
manner. In the meantime, we're left looking at correlations between
measures of productivity, patents, firm size, R&D, and competition
(measured as the inverse of profitability). We have to be pretty
cautious about what we can conclude from such correlations about
the worthiness of either scenario. The implications for patent policy
are even more tenuous.
In some cases the mapping from the empirical findings to the
differentmodelsofinnovationisnotveryclear.Thereceivedwisdom
is not that large firms are the most inventive. As formalized in
economic models, all the innovation is done by new entrants. Simi-
larly,sincethemodelsassociated withthereceivedwisdomtypically
assume free entry into research activity, it is not clear that the indus-
tries with more research activity will appear less competitive (more
profitable). In these models, profits get used up paying for research.
The paper is quite right, on the other hand, to point to the weak
connection between productivity growth and patenting. It is a genu-
ine puzzle on many levels that the industries with more inventive
activity do not experience much more rapid productivity growth.
Furthermore, this puzzle persists if you replace patents with R&D
spending. In his presidential address to the American Economic
Association, Zvi Griliches (1994) dwelled on this issue. Figure 2 in
his paper gives roughly the same message as Figures 14n4 in BCLO.
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Why are these relationships so weak? Griliches pointed to the diffi-
culty of measuring productivity. There are also conceptual issues.
An industry experiencing technological improvements will typically
expand into less productive activities, so that the expansion itself
may dampen measured productivity growth. This point is carefully
worked out in a recent paper by Arnaud Costinot, Dave Donaldson,
and Ivana Komunjer (2011).
The empirical work in the paper is a useful reminder that we
ought to be humble given how little we know in this field. The
authors suggest that the weakness of the evidence in favor of the
receivedwisdommeansthatthereislittlejustificationforourcurrent
patent system. Given our limited knowledge, I think the appropriate
response is to be very cautious in recommending dramatic changes
in that institution.
Other Promising Approaches
My critique of the empirical work in the paper may appear uncon-
structive. What is a good way of determining which view of innova-
tion and competition is more reasonable? Short of the rather heroic
approach I laid out in the beginning, how else might we use data
to answer the important question of how we can best reform the
patent system? I see at least three useful lines of attack:
c examining the key premises of the economic heresy view,
c exploiting macro evidence on patent-system reform, and
c conducting case studies on how actual inventors and users of
new technology interact with the patent system.
I consider each of these in turn.
Key Premises
The economic heresy view is built on the premise that technology,
while non-rival, is not easy to replicate. That premise appears very
solid, but ripe for empirical exploration. At the macro level it relates
towhymany countriesarenotexploiting state-of-the-arttechnology.
At the micro level it relates to why technologies don't spread faster.
For example, even Wal-Mart took a long time to spread across the
United States, as graphically illustrated in Holmes (2011). But what
is it that holds things back? Is it that technology is inherently costly
to replicate, generating rents to inventors? Or is it that users, either
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consumersorproducers,areresistanttonewtechnology,thusreduc-
ing the discounted flow of profits to inventors? A better understand-
ing of this phenomenon of slow replication seems central to the
issues of this paper and economics more generally.
Macro Evidence
Many countries have recently strengthened patent enforcement.
Sometimes these changes have been driven by internal pressure from
their own inventors, and sometimes by external pressure from devel-
oping countries who want their intellectual property protected. In
either case, these changes provide a laboratory within which to study
the consequences of changing the patent system. While Frederic
Scherer is mentioned in BCLO as buying into the received wisdom, I
have seen him point to evidence that when Italy adopted stronger
pharmaceutical patents, their pharmaceutical industry suffered.
Case Studies
Finally, in this area, case studies can be extremely valuable. In
preparing for this discussion I had a long conversation with my
cousin Max W. Durney, the inventor of the technology for folding
metal that I mentioned above. On the basis of this invention, which
is protected with numerous patents, he founded the company Indus-
trial Origami. He argues that his extensive use of patents was crucial
in attracting financing. Up-front financing was itself necessary to
invest in developing the technology and in marketing it to manufac-
turers who were initially resistant to adopting a new process. The
current patent system, while not without problems, can enable cre-
ative individuals to make a career inventing new technologies.
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Michele Boldrin and David Levine, in previous work and now in
this paper with Juan Correa-Allamand and Carmine Ornaghi, have
issued a powerful challenge to the idea that patent protection plays
an essential role in fostering technological innovation and improved
welfare for consumers. In fact, these authors go further at times and
argue that patent protection may in fact hinder rather than help
technological innovation.
Theauthorsstartthispaperwiththepremisethatitisastraightfor-
ward task to construct economic models such that patent protection
improves welfare when the models' parameters are in one region
and reduces welfare when the models' parameters are in another
region. They argue that, as a result, the question of whether patent
policy has a beneficial or harmful effect on innovation and consumer
welfare must be resolved on the basis of empirical evidence rather
than theory. In this paper, the authors aim to shed some light on
the empirical link between patents, competition, and technological
progress.
I anticipate that in his discussion, commenter Sam Kortum will
assess the contribution of this paper to the broader empirical litera-
ture on the relationship between patenting, innovation, and techno-
logical progress. Given the dictates of comparative advantage, I will
specialize in my discussion on the theoretical basis for arguing that
patent protection may be harmful rather than helpful to innovation
and welfare. I agree with the basic premise of the paper's authors
that the idea that patents are essential to support innovation in
equilibriumisdeeplyingrainedinmanyeconomists'andpolicymak-
ers' minds. While many practitioners would argue that there are
important flaws in patent policy as currently implemented in the
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United States (see, e.g., Shapiro 2007), the authors of this paper look
to go further and argue that the property rights conferred by patent
protection, even if executed well, may be harmful to innovation and
welfare. This view is the ``economic heresy'' the authors refer to in
their introduction. Given the strength of the authors' theoretical
arguments, I see my best chance of adding value to this debate is
to sketch a simple theoretical model of innovation with and without
patent protection to see how straightforward it is to have the welfare
implications of patents go either way.
My goal in sketching this model is to capture some of the ideas
the authors discuss in their paper about the difference between
innovation and imitation, and the role of a first-mover advantage for
innovators of some kind in supporting innovation without patent
protection in a way that complements the previous theoretical work
bytheseauthors.Theauthorsarecertainlycorrectthatthetheoretical
work assessing the impact of patent policy in general equilibrium
in the ``New Growth Theory'' literature is too special and narrow
and that much more theoretical and empirical work needs to be
done. What follows is a small contribution in that direction.
The central idea I would like to illustrate with this model is that,
in an economy with imperfect competition, incumbent firms built on
a successful innovation already have strategies available to preempt
entry by imitating firms even in the absence of patent protection.
As a theoretical matter, it is not at all clear that welfare is improved
if we enhance the strategic position of these incumbents by granting
thempatent protectionasanadditional tooltodeterentry ofcompet-
ing firms.
The model I use to illustrate this point starts with a demand
structure in which we can say that some products are closer substi-
tutes than others so that we can think about oligopoly in a particular
market nested in a larger general equilibrium economy as a whole.
To do so, posit a nested demand system with a continuum of poten-
tial sectors and many (but countable) potential goods within each
sector. A firm innovates by being the first to introduce a good into
a particular sector. To innovate, a firm must pay a high fixed cost
to introduce this first good in the sector. A firm imitates by being
the second or later to introduce a good into a particular sector. An
imitator benefits from following an innovator into a sector in that
the imitator pays a lower fixed cost to introduce this additional good
in the sector.
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To be more specific, let aggregate consumption be a constant
elasticity of substitution aggregate (CES) across sectors with
C 43*
N
0
yj
11
1
h dj4
h
h11
Here yj is the output of sector j and N is the measure of sectors that
have active firms producing goods in those sectors. The parameter
h is the elasticity of substitution across sector inputs in producing
final consumption. Standard arguments give that the induced
demand by final consumption producers for the output of sector j
is given by the CES (inverse) demand function
Pj
P
4~
yj
c!
1
1
h
where Pj is the price index for output of sector j and P is the price
index for final consumption C.
Output in sector j is a second CES aggregate across the output of
the Kj firms active in that sector
yj 43(
Kj
k41
q11
1
r jk 4
r
r11
where qjk is the output of the kth firm in sector j and r is the elasticity
of substitution across goods within the sector. To capture the idea
that goods within a sector are closer substitutes than goods in differ-
ent sectors, assume that r . h. With this ranking of elasticities, we
have the inverse demand curve for a particular good given by
Pjk
Pj
4~
qjk
yj!
1
1
r
where Pjk is the price of the kth good in sector j and the price index
for the sector Pk is constructed in the standard manner.
Now consider some simple economics of firms' decisions to inno-
vate and imitate when facing this demand structure. The returns to
either of these decisions will depend on the number of firms that
introduce goods in a particular sector. Assume that when it comes
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time to produce, firms active in a sector engage in price (Bertrand)
competition. With a finite number of goods in a sector, the perceived
elasticity of residual demand for each firm in a sector Ð and hence
the markup over marginal cost charged by that firm Ð depends on
that firm's share of the market in that sector.1 If there are no imitators
that follow an innovating firm into a particular sector, then that
innovating firm enjoys a high profit from its innovation not only
because it commands the entire market but also because it charges
a high markup corresponding to the low elasticity of substitution h
across sectors. If many imitators follow an innovating firm into a
sector, each firm has a small market share in the sector and markups
are small corresponding to the high perceived elasticity of residual
demand for each firm as determined by r. A firm that innovates
pays an entry cost c1, while a firm that imitates pays an entry costs
c2, with c1 $ c2.
Are patents necessary to support innovation in this environment?
The answer to this question depends on parameters.
If the cost of imitation is zero and there are potential profits for
an imitator (i.e., r , `), then the answer is yes. We cannot have an
equilibrium in which an incumbent innovator earns the positive
profits necessary to recoup the innovation cost c1 . 0 without attract-
ing entry from imitators. This particular parameter configuration
corresponds to the standard assumption that imitation is truly cost-
less and in this special case it is likely impossible to support innova-
tion in equilibrium without some regulation of imitation such as
patent protection. As the authors of this paper correctly point out,
this special case of zero imitation costs likely lies at the heart of
most thinking by policymakers about intellectual property.
How general is this argument for patent protection? Not very.
Consider, for example, the case in which goods within a sector are
perfect substitutes (r 4 `) and imitation costs are positive (c 2 . 0).
In this case, with goods within a sector being perfect substitutes,
1 This dependence of elasticities on market shares arises as a result of the assumption
that there are only a finite number of goods Kj being produced in any given sector.
As a result, firms must take into account that the price that they choose affects the
sectoral price index Pj and thus overall demand for the sectoral output yj in addition
to the share of spending in the sector on their specific good. In contrast, with a
continuum of sectors, individual firms take the overall consumption price index P
and level of consumption C as given.
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entry by a second firm as an imitator in a sector eliminates all profits
for both the innovator and the imitator by driving prices down
to marginal cost through Bertrand competition. Here, there are no
returns to imitation. All firms prefer to innovate in a new sector and
enjoy monopoly profits in that sector rather than imitate. In this
extreme case, innovators here are protected from imitation as long
as there is some cost to imitation.2 Similar logic holds that patent
protection is also unnecessary if imitation costs are equal to innova-
tion costs c2 4 c1 regardless of the elasticity r between goods in a
sector. In these cases, adding patent protection to the economy has
no impact on equilibrium innovation and welfare.
In these special cases, the impact of patent protection on innova-
tion and welfare is easy to see. What happens, however, for more
general values of imitation costs relative to innovation costs (0 , c2
, c1) and elasticities across sectors and goods (h , r , `)? Are the
impacts of patent policy on innovation, imitation, and consumer
welfare purely a problem of parameter values in this more general
case? Or are there some more general lessons we might draw even
in this simple environment?
It is impossible to give a fully worked-out answer to these ques-
tions without specifying the details of the model of entry and the
post-entry competition between innovators and imitators, but I con-
jecture that older ideas about how innovators might preempt entry
by imitators in the absence of patent protection may well be useful
for drawing more general conclusions about the impact of patents
on welfare. The key economic idea to note is that, even in the absence
of patent protection, an innovating firm in a particular sector has a
first mover advantage in that it can use product proliferation through
imitation of its own products as a strategy to simultaneously main-
tain monopoly profits with high markups in equilibrium and to
effectively deter entry by imitating firms that might seek to compete
with it in the sector.3
2 This idea that firms in a market with imperfect competition will choose to avoid
competing with each other in equilibrium is a long-standing one in economics. See,
for example, Prescott (1977) and Vogel (2008).
3 See Ellison (2011) for recent work documenting how pharmaceutical companies use
product proliferation as a strategic device to deter entry by generics as the expiration
of their patent protection approaches.
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The basic idea is as follows: A single firm that has paid both the
innovation cost c1 for the first good in a sector and the imitation
cost c2 for additional goods in that same sector can charge a high
markup for all of those goods by setting high prices (and low quanti-
ties) in a coordinated fashion across its product line if there are no
other imitators in the sector and, at the same time, credibly convince
any potential imitators that the competitive outcome that would
emerge if that firm were actually to enter the sector would be very
unfavorable to that firm because it would have such a small market
share. Essentially, an innovator has the strategic incentive to build
on his own innovation through imitation to fill up the sector with
his own products. In contrast, if a new firm considers entry into the
sector through imitation, it faces the prospect of competition with
the original innovator as an incumbent in a powerful position.
What can we conjecture about equilibrium in an economy of this
kind in which an innovator can obtain patent protection for his
innovation that is broad enough in scope to prevent imitation by
other firms looking to introduce goods into the sector? Here patents
may well serve the imitation preemption role for innovators that
product proliferation serves in the economy without patents. What
aretheimplicationsofthiscomparisonbetweenaneconomywithout
patents and with patents for product creation and welfare? With
patents, innovators will clearly charge high prices and enjoy monop-
oly profits, just as in the equilibrium without patents, so in this
respect the two economies might look similar. With patents, how-
ever, innovating firms will not feel the competitive pressure from
the threat of imitation by other firms to introduce additional prod-
ucts into the sector that they have innovated in and hence consumers
will not benefit from the additional (and relatively cheap) product
creation that occurs in the economy without patents when innovat-
ing firms fill up their sector with products to deter entry. Hence, by
introducing patent protection for innovators, policymakers will in
fact have reduced one incentive for product creation without neces-
sarily increasing other incentives to innovate sufficiently to deliver
a compensating increase of entry into new sectors.
The overall impact of patent protection on welfare would depend
on the general equilibrium reallocation of products across sectors
and would require a much fuller analysis of a fully specified model,
but the possibilities that patent protection may be a drag on the
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creation of new products should be clear from the arguments laid
out here. What is even clearer is that the economic thinking on this
topic has not been well fleshed out in the academic literature. The
authors of this paper have set a bold agenda that should provoke
considerable further development of our thinking on this impor-
tant topic.
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